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A Game Theoretic Analysis of U.S. Rice Export Policy: 
 The case of Japan and Korea 
Introduction 
As a result of the Uruguay Round (UR), the impact on the international rice market 
is dramatic.  In addition, another round of the WTO trade negotiations has started and the 
impacts of potential policy changes on rice trade are unknown.  The major U.S. benefit of 
the UR has been the access to the Japanese market.  However, the U.S. share of this 
import market has been unstable and the share of Korean rice market is nearly zero prior 
to February 2002. 
In December 1998, the Japanese government notified the WTO of its decision to 
introduce rice tariffication beginning April 1, 1999.  Under tariffication, a specific duty of 
351.17 yen per kilogram (kg) was applied to imports outside of the MA volume.  In and 
after Japanese fiscal year (JFY) 2000, April to March, a specific duty of 341 yen per kg 
was applied to imports outside of MA (MAFF, 1999).  The result of tariffication is lower 
import volumes than what would have occurred with the original MA quota, 38 thousand 
MT less in 1999 and 76 thousand MT less in 2000 (USDA, 2002) 
In the meantime, Korea had not imported its MA from the U.S. before February 
2002.  Korea has not imported high quality rice to avoid table competition.  The country 
imported low quality rice, California no. 3 or lower, to meet its WTO commitments, and 
use the imported rice for the purpose of processing only.  However, Korean government 
switched its rice import policy in February 2002.  In fact, Korea imported 30 thousand 
MT of California no 1, which is as high quality as Korean rice.  This is the first time that 
Korea imported U.S. rice to meet its WTO commitment since the UR.  From the U.S. 
standpoint, this is a good sign of trading U.S. rice with Korea.  Therefore, U.S. rice 
exporters are expecting to increase their rice exports to Korea.  However, traditional 
leading rice exporters, such as Thailand and the United States, have gradually lost market 
share to newly emerging exporters, primarily Vietnam and India.  
Nevertheless, the U.S. rice industry can potentially increase its market share in 
Japanese and Korean rice import markets, given that both countries will likely be 
required to expand their imports in the next round of the WTO negotiations.  Expanded 
market access remains one of the most important issues for rice trade.  Both the tariff  2 
level and quota will receive considerable attention in the ongoing negotiations.  Similar 
pressure will be on the MA quota for South Korea along with a push for tariffication 
(Wailes, 2000; Cramer, et al., 1999; Koo, et al., 1996). 
Looking at the historical and recent structural changes in both countries, it is 
useful for the U.S. rice industry, especially the export market, to examine how much 
market share the U.S. can potentially obtain in the Japanese and Korean markets.  In 
addition, it is important to examine how changes in Japanese and Korean rice policies, as 
related to their WTO commitments, will impact U.S. exports. 
Japanese and Korean Rice Policy Changes 
Japan’s current rice policy has its roots in the country’s economic development 
policy following World War II.  At that time the government sought to encourage rice 
production through investment in rural infrastructure, research, and extension, while 
keeping producer rice prices low.  The government’s policy was carried out under the 
Staple Food Control Law (The 42 Act).  The purpose of the law was to control food and 
to carry out the adjustment of supply, demand and prices and also to control distribution 
in order to secure food for consumers and to ensure stability in the national economy.  
The 42 Act gave the government exclusive control over the purchase, sale, and pricing of 
major foods such as rice, wheat, barley, and potatoes (MAFF, 1995; Kako, et al., 1995).   
High support prices not only resulted in the accumulation of increasing levels of 
surplus rice in government stocks, but also contributed to increasing government budget 
deficits.  To cope with excess production, the government sought to divert farmers to 
other crops and to dispose of surplus government rice stocks.  The Japanese Food Agency 
(JFA) responded to overproduction primarily in two ways: diversion programs and 
surplus disposal schemes.  These efforts failed as rice stocks again doubled by the end of 
the decade. 
Recently, the situation in the Japanese rice industry has been changing drastically 
because of the implementation of the GATT Uruguay Round agreement.  The GATT 
agreement allows Japan to exempt rice from tariffication for the period 1995-2001. Even 
this partial opening of Japanese rice market has been shown to a large impact on the 
domestic and international rice industry (Cramer, et al., 1996).  3 
Besides the MA rice imports, the Japanese rice sector faces several emerging 
issues.  First, domestic rice production costs are far above the international prices due to 
the small scale of farming, relatively high labor costs, high land costs, and over 
investment in farm machinery.  Second, rice is an inferior good in Japan, and a decrease 
in rice consumption will likely continue in the future (Ito, 1996).  On the other hand, rice 
supply would increase as a result of the MA rice import and an increase in rice yield.  
Therefore, the rice diversion program may have to be strengthened in the future in order 
to maintain a balance between supply and demand.  Third, the average age of rice farmers 
has been increasing because of the decline in the number of young farmers staying on the 
farm.  This is due to the inferior income from rice farming and less favorable working 
conditions compared with non-agricultural economic activities. 
The purpose of rice policy in Korea is to contribute to food security and the 
stability of the national economy, achieving self-sufficiency of table rice (MAFF, 2000).  
This policy has the following objectives: efficient production of rice, alignment of 
demand and supply of rice and maintenance of reasonable prices.  In order to achieve its 
goal of self-sufficiency of table rice, MAFF has strengthened its rice production policy, 
focusing on improving quality.   
From 1990, the rice policy was more concerned with the burdensome rice stocks 
and a deficit in the government grain account.  The government intervened in the rice 
market and began to sell the government stocks for price stabilization.  As a result, the 
market price of rice declined and the private market system became extremely unstable.  
At that time, direct management by the government was changed into an indirect 
management system, including agricultural cooperative associations.  The main 
components of the indirect management system were: 1) allowance of seasonal variation 
in price, 2) introduction of the deficiency payment system that the government 
supplements the difference between the purchase and the market prices, and 3) abolition 
of the rice control fund (MAFF, 1997). 
During this period, the full scale import of agricultural products was initiated 
under pressure by developed countries.  For instance, The Super 301' trade legislation in 
the U.S. forced Korea to open its agricultural markets.  Another international legal code  4 
that led to the liberalization of Korean agricultural markets was the Uruguay Round 
agreement of the GATT.  Accordingly, liberalization was made for 234 commodity areas. 
Thereafter, the main stream of agricultural policy was transformed from the policy 
of self-sufficiency to the policy of import liberalization, from price policy to structure 
policy, and from agricultural income policy to non-agricultural income policy, etc. 
Starting in 1997 the Korean government introduced a new program, a direct 
payment system to encourage small and medium-sized rice farmers to retire and transfer 
productive lands to form larger operations.  Productivity would then be enhanced through 
greater economies of scale (USDA/Attaché report, 1998).   
According to the UR agreement, Korea was bound to specified import levels under 
the minimum access rules.  Korea has to increase rice imports under the minimum access 
rules from 1.0 % in 1995 to 4.0% of base year consumption (1986-1988) by 2004.  In 
1995, Korea was supposed to import 51 thousand MT of rice for the first year of 
UR/GATT agreement implementation. However, Korea imported 115 thousand MT in 
1995, which is mainly due to production shortfall.  In 2000, Korea imported 130 
thousand MT of rice as the UR agreement commitment.  
Despite protestations from the U.S. government, Korean MAFF has announced 
that all rice imported during the initial years was for processing purposes only.  The U.S. 
government’s position is that this is against the spirit if not the law of the UR agreement. 
Among competitors, many local experts expect China to be a major supplier over 
the long term.  China has reportedly developed new varieties of rice to meet Korean taste.  
This rice is being grown by ethnic Koreans in the northeastern provinces of Jilin, 
Liaoning and Heilongjinag (USDA, 1998). 
The price of Chinese rice is about one-eighth that of similar rice produced in 
Korea.  China also has the obvious advantage of lower transportation cost due to its close 
proximity to Korea.  Vietnam and Thailand are also reportedly making plans to export 
their long-grain rice.  Australia is also aggressively seeking to gain a share of any 
medium-grain rice imported by Korea.  China has been a major rice exporter to Korea.  
For example, Korea imported 51 thousand MT of Indian rice to meet its MA 
requirements in 1995. This rice was intended to meet its 1995 obligations. Since then, 
Korea imported additional 64 thousand MT of medium grain rice from China to meet its  5 
1996 MA requirements in 1997. In addition, Korea imported 81 thousand MT from China 
and 13 thousand MT from Thailand in 1999 (USDA, 2000).  
The WTO Agreement also requires a reduction of domestic production subsidies, 
which is also leading to a further reduction in rice production in Korea.  While the 
Agreement allows for decoupled income compensation, which means a production-
neutral subsidy, Korea is not implementing this direct payment system for all farmers yet 
(MAFF, 2000). 
U. S. Rice Exports 
The U.S. is a leading exporter of rice in the international market, accounting for 
about 12 percent of global rice trade although the U.S. accounts for less than 2 percent of 
global rice production.  The U.S. currently ranks fourth among major exporters, behind 
Thailand, Vietnam, and China.  More than 40 percent of the U.S. rice crop is exported 
each year, making the U.S. market sensitive to movements in international prices (USDA, 
2000).  
Most countries produce only one type of rice, but the United States produces both 
types (japonica in California, and indica in Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, and 
Missouri) and is in a unique position in that it can export significant amounts of both 
types (Song and Carter, 1996). 
The total volume of U.S. exports ranged from 2.5 MMT to 2.8 MMT (milled 
basis) from 1995/96 to 1999/2000.  However, this is well below the 1994/95 record of 3.3 
MMT.  The U.S. was the largest exporter of rice most years from the late 1960s through 
1980, with Thailand occasionally out-shipping the U.S.  However, Thailand has been the 
leading exporter of rice every year since 1981, largely due to expanded area.  By the mid-
1990s, Vietnam had recovered from decades of war and political upheavals to become the 
second largest exporter.  The country had returned as an exporter only in the late 1980s 
after a 30-year absence.  In the late-1990s, China emerged as a major exporter due to 
declining per capita consumption and several years of bumper crops, making the country 
the third largest exporter.    
From 1967 to 1982, Korea imported 8 million metric tons (MMT) of rice and U.S. 
rice exports supplied 65% of that market mostly from California (Schnepf and Just, 
1995).  However, by the mid-1980s, Korea attained self-sufficiency in rice due to  6 
generous government programs, and imports were essentially banned.  After losing its 
largest importer, Korea, in 1983, California accumulated rice stocks, relative to the 
southern states. Since 1983, the U.S. exported almost no rice to Korea.  
In the meantime, Japan accounts for the bulk of U.S. medium grain brown rice 
exports.  In 1999/2000, Japan imported nearly 150 thousand MT of medium grain brown 
rice from the U.S., down from a year earlier record 250 thousand MT.  Japan divides its 
rice purchases between milled and brown rice, with each type’s share varying each year.  
The U.S. typically supplies half of Japan’s total rice purchases.  The U.S. exports about 
10 thousand to 14 thousand MT of short grain brown rice each year.  Japan accounts for 
two-thirds, most of it sold under the Simultaneous-Buy-Sell (SBS) portion of their total 
WTO commitments. 
There are four types of government programs for U.S. rice exports.  First, under 
PL 480, the U.S. sells rice on concessional credit terms and donates rice to needy 
countries either bilaterally or through the World Food Program.  Second, the USDA 
provides export credit guarantees (GSM-102) and intermediate Export Credit Guarantee 
(GSM-103) for commercial financing of U.S. agricultural exports.  The programs 
encourage exports to buyers in countries where credit is necessary to maintain or increase 
U.S. sales, but where financing may not be available without CCC guarantees. 
Third, the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) facilitates U.S. rice sales to 
markets where the U.S. competes with subsidized exports from other countries.   
However, 1996 Farm Act terminated EEP.  Since then there has been no rice exported 
through the EEP.  Finally, USDA funds the creation, expansion, and maintenance of 
foreign markets for U.S. agricultural products.  The Market Access Program (MAP) 
forms a partnership between non-profit U.S. agricultural trade associations, U.S. 
agricultural cooperatives, non-profit State-regional trade groups, small U.S. businesses, 
and the CCC to share the costs of overseas marketing and promotional activities such as 
consumer promotions, market research, trade shows, and trade servicing.  The Foreign 
Market Development (FMD) program fosters a trade promotion partnership between 
USDA and U.S. agricultural producers and processors who are represented by nonprofit 
commodity or trade associations called Cooperators (Childs and Burdett, 2000). 
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Theoretical and Empirical Consideration 
In this study, the linkage of the Japanese and Korean rice imports and U.S. rice 
exports are analyzed using a game theoretic approach along with econometric supply and 
demand models and the Political Preference Function (PPF) determination. 
The Japanese and Korean rice economies are analyzed using empirical supply and 
demand models and the elasticity estimates.  For the U.S., the export demand is estimated 
using an empirical econometric model. The elasticities are estimated as well.  For U.S. 
rice exports, the domestic supply and demand are not estimated because this study 
focuses on the linkage between the Japanese and Korean imports and U.S. exports, not on 
the U.S. domestic rice economy.   For the reason, only U.S. export demand is   estimated. 
In addition, a political preference function (PPF) approach is applied to measure 
the implicit political weights of interest groups of these three countries that represent the 
policy-influencing powers because rice can be considered one of the political 
commodities in these countries.   
Supply and Demand Specification 
Agricultural producers operate in an environment with uncertain yields and prices. 
Farmers typically make production decisions at the beginning of the season, knowing 
neither the market price for their products at harvest time or the weather conditions 
during the season that will determine their yields. Various models could be applied to the 
commodity markets depending on the objective of research and the market structure.  For 
the purpose of this study, a distributed lag structure is specified to describe the dynamic 
responses of supply and demand caused by the price expectations and adjustment 
process. The assumption that the economic system has a distributed lag structure is often 
justified on the ground that changes in an endogenous variable caused by an exogenous 
shock may occur through time, and the impacts of exogenous changes on the dependent 
variable take time to work. 
Since rice farmers tend to have a lagged response to market prices due to the fixity 
of inputs and imperfect information, the partial adjustment model can be hypothesized as 
an appropriate model for the study.  Furthermore, habit formation seems to be a 
predominant characteristic of agricultural demand behavior, particularly for a national 
staple food like rice in Japan and Korea. With rice being an important staple food,  8 
consumers may also buy stable quantities that are different from the equilibrium 
quantities indicated by their static demand equation. This implies that consumers tend to 
adjust only partially to changes in optimal purchase quantities. Thus, the partial 
adjustment model is also thought to be an appropriate model for explaining the dynamic 
nature of the Korean and Japanese rice consumption. In consumer demand it is assumed 
that consumers do not adjust their consumption behavior instantaneously to changes in 
price and income due to habit formation.  The dynamic econometric model specified in 
this study is characterized by a combination of a partial adjustment process both in supply 
and demand, and cobweb type price expectations in supply response. 
Based on the theoretical considerations and the market structure concerning the 
commodity model in the previous section, the empirical econometric models for the three 
countries’ rice markets are specified for the period 1960-1999.  According to economic 
theory, supply can be influenced by prices, technology, costs and other factors. For 
domestic consumption, it can be hypothesized to be influenced by prices, income levels, 
and the price of substitutes according to economic theory.  For Japan and Korea, the 
model is composed of three equations: domestic acreage response, yield, and per capita 
consumption.  Two identities are defined to impose the aggregate domestic production 
and consumption.  Domestic production is defined by acreage response times yield, and 
domestic consumption is defined by multiplying population times the estimated equation 
for per capita consumption and adding in other use.  The general functional forms and 
variables for the rice supply and demand estimation are presented as follows: 
Japanese Yield: 
JYIED = f(TECH, D, u1t)           ( 1 )  
Japanese Area Harvested: 
JARHA = f(JARHAt-1, JPROPt/CPIt, JPROCt/CPIt, u2t)        (2) 
Japanese Per Capita Consumption: 
JPCCON = f(JRETPt/CPIt, JINCOMt/CPIt, JPCCONt-1, u3t)      (3) 
Korean Yield: 
KYIED = f(TECH, KYIEDt-1, D, u4t)         (4) 
Korean Area Harvested: 
KARHA = f(KARHAt-1, KGPURPt-1/CPIt-1, KPRODCt-1/CPIt-1, u5t)   (5)  9 
Korean Per Capita Consumption: 
KPCCON = f(KRETPt/CPIt, KINCOMt/CPIt, KPCCONt-1, u6t)   (6) 
U.S. Export Demand: 
UEXDEM = f(WOLDPJt/EXPIt, UGOEXPt, WENSTt-1, D, u7t)     (7) 
Production: 
JPROD  =  JYIED  *  JARHA          (8) 
KPROD = KYIED * KARHA             (9) 
Consumption: 
JCONP = JPCCON * JPOP + OTHER                  (10) 
KCONP = KPCCON * KPOP + OTHER                   (11) 
where TECH = Technology 
JARHAt-1 = Lagged Japanese Area Harvested (1000 ha) 
JPROPt = Japanese Producer Price (yen/MT) 
CPIt = Consumer Price Index 
JPROCt = Japanese Production Cost (yen/ha) 
JRETPt = Japanese Retail Price (yen/MT) 
JINCOMt = Japanese Income ($) 
JPCCONt-1 = Lagged Japanese Per Capita Consumption (kg) 
KYIELDt-1 = Lagged Korean Yield (MT/ha) 
KARHAt-1 = Lagged Korean Area Harvested (1000 ha) 
KGPURPt-1 = Lagged Korean Government Purchase Price (won/MT) 
PRODCt-1 = Lagged Korean Production Costs (won/ha) 
KRETPt = Korean Retail Price (won/MT) 
KINCOMt = Korean Income ($) 
KPCCONt-1 = Lagged Korean per capita Consumption (kg) 
WOLDPJt = World Price ($/MT) 
EXPIt = Domestic Rice Price ($/MT) 
UGOEXPt = U.S. Government Export Program (1000 MT) 
WENSTt-1 = Lagged World Ending Stock (1000 MT) 
D = Dummy Variables 
uit = Error Terms  10  
POP = Population 
OTHER = Other Consumption (1000 MT) 
The structural model in this study is estimated based upon annual time series data 
from 1960 to 1999 with all prices and income variables deflated by the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI).  The necessary data was obtained from the USDA, Japanese and Korean 
MAFF, World Bank, IMF, and International Rice Research Institute (IRRI).  
The rice yield and area harvested equations are estimated by Two Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) and the per capita consumption and U.S. export demand equations are 
estimated by conventional ordinary least squares (OLS) and the autoregressive degree of 
one (AR(1)) as an attempt to correct for autocorrelation. 
The estimation results of the model are shown in table 1.  The consumer price 
index is omitted for convenience.  In addition, the value of the Durbin’s h statistic is also 
given for each equation since the lagged dependent variable appears as an independent 
variable. 
Equations (1) and (4) indicate that yield is a function of technology and a dummy 
variable for Japan and these two variables with a lagged yield variable for Korea.  The 
dummy variable is used to explain poor weather conditions in 1980 and 1993.  A time 
trend is used as a proxy for technological developments and advancements.  Japanese and 
Korean yield equations have a coefficient of determination of 0.80 and 0.87, respectively.  
All of the variables are statistically significant at the 5% level of significance.  D-W 
(1.78) and D-h (1.13) statistics show that there is no autocorrelation in the equations. 
The results of the acreage response estimation show the expected signs for all 
explanatory variables that are implied in the theory of production.  Except for the 
constant terms, all parameter estimates are different from zero at the 5% level of 
significance.  The prices received by rice farmers in both countries have a positive impact 
on the acreage response, as expected.  The production costs for Japan and the diversion 
program for Korea have a negative impact on the supply response.  The coefficient 
estimate of the lagged dependent variables show a stable geometric lag process and 
supports the existence of a lagged distribution of the dependent variables.  The high 
estimates of the lagged acreage variables for Japan and Korea, 0.84 and 0.93 respectively, 
imply that it takes time for farmers to change the paddy land for rice cultivation in  11  
response to the price signals.  The supply elasticities with respect to the output at the 
mean for Japan and Korea are 0.11 and 0.13, respectively. 
   Table 1. Empirical Results of Production and Consumption. 
  Production: 
  JYIED = 3.5579 + 0.0313*TECH – 0.8874*DM8093 
                  (54.84)              (11.52)                (-5.96) 
  AdjR
2 = 0.80  D-W = 1.78  Method = 2SLS 
 
  KYIED = 1.546 + 0.468*KYIEDt-1 + 0.031*TECH – 0.742*DM8093 
                   (4.31)              (3.71)                   (3.80)                (-3.69) 
  AdjR
2 = 0.87  D-h = 1.13  Method = 2SLS 
 
  JARHV = 294.176 + 0.843*JARHVt-1 + 0.175*JPRODP – 0.027*JPRODC 
                      (1.63)                 (13.07)                 (2.35)                   (-2.57) 
  AdjR
2 = 0.96  D-h = 0.59  Method = 2SLS 
 
  KARHV = 50.76 + 0.932*KARHVt-1 + 0.000059*KGROP – 0.006*KDIVR 
                  (0.42)                (10.93)                        (2.34)                  (-4.34) 
  AdjR
2 = 0.96  D-h = 0.98  Method = 2SLS 
  Consumption: 
  LnJPCCON = 1.8133 + 0.8202*LnJPCCONt-1 – 0.0963*LnJRETP – 0.029*LnJINCOM 
                          (4.77)                     (15.42)                       (-3.65)                     (-2.15) 
  AdjR
2 = 0.99  D-h = 1.25  Method = OLS/AR(1) 
 
  LnKPCCON = 5.461 + 0.7203*LnKPPCCONt-1 - 0.23*LnKRETP  
                          (4.1)                       (10.27)                     (-2.42)         
                         - 0.56*LnKINCOM + 0.2073*DM1 
                                      (-3.4)                      (2.96) 
AdjR
2 = 0.99  D-h = 0.72  Method = OLS/AR(1) 
  U.S. Export Demand: 
  LUEXDEM = 2.681 + 0.4902*LWENSTK + 0.036*L(WOLDP/UPRODP) 
                                       (3.26)                    (6.09)                              (1.97) 
                         + 0.031*LUGEXP+ 0.274*DM8094 
                                      (1.72)                        (3.2) 
  AdjR
2 = 0.84  D-W = 1.7  Estimator = OLS/AR(1) 
   Note: the numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
 
Except for the constant terms, all independent variables in the per capita 
consumption equations show strong statistical significance and expected signs.  All 
coefficient estimates are significant at the 5% level of significance.  Rice consumption is 
negatively related to own price as well as income, which implies that rice is an inferior 
good in Japan and Korea.  This is a phenomenon which has been experienced over the  12  
last decade in Japan and Korea as their income levels have risen.  The coefficients on the 
one year lagged dependent variables are also significant at the 1% level of significance.   
These coefficients imply that there have been gradual changes in diet patterns, 
which impact rice consumption.  In fact, the increases in the income levels have 
transformed the Japanese and Korean diet by substituting rice with consumption of 
meats, fruits, and vegetables.  The price elasticities for Japan and Korea are estimated to 
be -0.096 and -0.23, respectively.  The income elasticities are also computed at -0.029 
and -0.56, respectively. 
For the equation of U.S. export demand, all of the independent variables are 
statistically significant at the 5% level except for government export program.  U.S. 
export demand estimation shows the expected signs for all explanatory variables.  When 
the gap between world price and domestic price received by producers are widened, the 
producers’ willingness to export rice tends to be higher.  A dummy variable for the years 
of 1980 and 1994 is used to explain unusual high exports caused by Japan and Korea due 
to unexpected cold weather in 1980 and 1993.  In addition, there is no autocorrelation in 
the equation (D-W = 1.92). 
Model Specification and Validation 
Tests for detecting error structure in the single equation context are conducted to 
identify whether the estimators used in the models are appropriate.  Statistical tests for 
autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and other specification problems are described. 
Based upon various statistical tests for autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and 
normality, the model specification tests are conducted in the single equation context.   
This study uses two goodness-of-fit measures to evaluate the overall predictive ability of 
the model: 1) root-mean-square percent error (rms  %) and 2) Theil’s inequality 
coefficient (U). 
The validation statistics show that the models do a good job of representing the 
rice economies.  The rms and Theil-U measures indicate that the models simulate the data 
well over the historical period.  The rms indicates that the models have rms from 0.26% 
root-mean-square error to 5.01%.  And U
M, U
S, U
C and Theil-U illustrate that we are able 
to use the models to explain the historical rice economies with very low values for U
M 
reflecting no systematic bias in the models.  13  
   Table 2. Specification and Model Validation Test. 
             Specification Tests 
                                    Autocorrelation          Heteroscadasticity          Normality 
                                        (D-W, D-h)         (White, Breusch-Pagan)    (Bera-Jarque) 
               JYIELD              1.78, na                       13.12, 11.23                     1.55 
               JARHA               na, 0.59                  11.23, 12.81                      1.41 
               JPCCON             na, 1.25                    12.02, 10.65                      2.41 
               KYIELD             na, 1.77                       3.51, 1.14                        1.42 
               KARHA              na, 0.97                       4.31, 2.06                       1.41 
               KPCCON            na, 0.72                     14.51, 4.25                       1.50 
               UEXDEM            1.7, na                        8.65, 2.21                    0.94 
             Model Validation Tests  
                                    rms % error     U
M         U
S        U
C      Theil-U1      U 
               JYIELD            5.01           0.00       0.06      0.94       0.047       0.024 
               JARHA             3.18           0.00       0.01      0.99       0.030       0.015 
               JPCONP           0.26           0.00       0.00      1.00       0.003       0.001 
               KYIELD           4.05           0.00       0.04      0.96       0.065       0.032 
               KARHA            1.86           0.00       0.03      0.97       0.019       0.009 
               KPCCON          2.41           0.00       0.00      1.00       0.022       0.011 
               UEXDEM         1.44           0.00       0.04      0.96      0.014       0.007 
    Note: we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation, heteroscadasticity, and the  
              error terms are distributed normally in all of specification tests at the 5% level of significance. 
 
Political Weight Determination 
To derive the political weights of interest groups in the three rice sectors, it is 
assumed that there are three interest groups: producers, consumers and taxpayers.  We are 
interested in the net effect on producers and consumers of price policies in the 
threecountries.  Hence if PS and PD are the prices for producers and consumers, then the 
net producer benefit from having a price PS instead of PW, which is defined as no 
intervention or border price, is measured by the change in producer surplus.  Similarly, 
the net consumer welfare is measured by the change in consumer surplus.  On the other 
hand, the taxpayers or government net expenditure is defined as: GS= PD*QD - PS*QS -  14  
PW*M; where QS, QD and M denote the levels of production, consumption, and net 
imports, respectively.  The first term on the right hand side of the equation is the 
government revenue from selling to consumers, the second term is the cost of purchasing 
from producers, and the third term is the payment for imported rice.  
Now suppose that the policy maker seeks to maximize a political preference 
function consisting of producer's surplus, consumer's surplus and taxpayer's expenditures 
by choosing the optimal domestic producer and consumer prices. The political preference 
function for the policymaker in the three rice sectors is: 
Maximize
d S P P ,
 PPF  










() ∫  + λG {[PD D(PD) -  PS S(PS)] 
   - [ PW(D(PD)-  S(PS))  ]},          (4.2.1) 
For simplicity, it is assumed that there is no intertemporal storage activity.   
Assuming no stock changes, the net imported quantity for Japan and South Korea (the net 
exported quantity for the U.S.) can be expressed as D(PD) - S(PS).  Consumer and 
producer prices are the policy variables.  Then, the optimal price policy can be obtained 
by differentiating the political preference function with respect to producer price, PS and 
consumer price, PD, respectively.  To solve the optimization problem, the governments 










= D(PD)(λG - λC) + D'(PD)* λG (PD - PW)  =  0     (13) 
In addition, we have additional normalization equations such that λP + λC + λG = 3 
and λG = 1 in order to compare with the social welfare function that has unit equal weight 
to each interest group (λP = λC = λG = 1) and for simplicity. 
Once we have established functional relations between the political weights and 
the levels of rice policies, we can derive the formulas for describing endogenous  15  
domestic prices for producers and consumers. Arranging the above first order conditions, 
we have the following equations for endogenous price determination:  
PS
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From these equations, it is possible to evaluate how political and economic factors 
contribute to the establishment of endogenous price levels. First, the border price for rice 
impacts domestic pricing policies. Second, the domestic market situations in terms of the 
production and consumption functions also have impacts on the formation of producer 
and consumer prices. Third, the above equations imply that political weights of the 
producer, consumer and taxpayer are all involved in the process of rice price decisions. 
For example, a larger political weight for producers relative to taxpayers would increase 
the producer price.  In addition, the difference between producer and consumer prices is 
not affected by the world price. 
The price difference is purely determined by domestic supply and demand factors, 
and the relative political weights of producers and consumers to that of taxpayers. In 
particular, assuming supply and demand elasticities are constant, the optimal price 
wedges are derived as follows: 
α = (PS* - PW) / PS* = (λP - λG)/λG * (1/ε)       ( 1 6 )  
β = (PD* - PW) / PD* = (λC - λG)/λG * (1/η)       ( 1 7 )  
where α and β represent the optimal producer and consumer price wedge, ε and η denote 
the supply and demand elasticity.  The optimal price wedges are simple forms of implicit 
political weights and elasticities of demand and supply.  All of the elements of these 
optimal conditions, except the political weights, are typically observable either directly or 
from econometric estimates.  Therefore, assuming that policymakers have chosen the 
optimal level of a given policy tool so as to maximize an implicit political preference, one 
can easily determine the political weights used by policymakers. (Im, 2000, Gardner, 
1987).  16  
Given the estimated elasticities of demand and supply from the domestic 
production and consumption functions, we can derive the political weights of the three 
major interest groups in the three rice economies.  The estimated results from the rice 
market models are shown in Table 2.  To derive these estimates, supply and demand 
elasticities were combined with annual producer and consumer price, and world price 
data from 1960 to 1999.   
  Table 2. Political Weights for the Three Countries. 
                                          Japan                                    Korea                           U.S. 
           Year          Producer        Consumer       Producer      Consumer         Exporter 
          1960              1.08                 0.92               1.19                0.81                 1.15 
          1965              1.12                 0.88               0.81                1.19                 0.84 
          1970              1.16                 0.84               1.04                 0.96                1.18 
          1975              1.16                 0.84               1.07                 0.93                1.32 
          1980              1.19                 0.81               1.20                 0.80                1.17 
          1985              1.24                 0.76               1.38                 0.62                1.31 
          1990              1.26                 0.74               1.44                 0.56                1.30 
          1991              1.26                 0.74               1.44                 0.56                1.29 
          1992              1.26                 0.74               1.44                 0.59                1.41 
          1993              1.26                 0.74               1.41                 0.55                1.33 
          1994              1.27                 0.73               1.45                 0.55                1.31 
          1995              1.27                 0.73               1.44                 0.56                1.24 
          1996              1.26                 0.74               1.46                 0.54                1.23 
          1997              1.26                 0.74               1.46                 0.54                1.23 
          1998              1.26                 0.74               1.45                 0.55                1.19 
          1999              1.25                 0.75               1.37                 0.63                1.30 
 
The estimated political weights as shown in Table 2 indicate that the Japanese and 
Korean policies have favored rice producers more than the other interest groups.  In the 
Japanese and Korean rice sectors, the political weights are particularly high for 
producers, lowest for consumers.  The average weights for producers exceed unity while 
those for consumers are less than unity.  Table 2 shows that a political willingness to 
redistribute income in favor of producers at the expense of consumers and taxpayers.  
This implies that rice producers have generally been preferred to consumers and 
taxpayers.   In other words, the Japanese and Korean policymakers have placed more 
weights on the welfare of rice producers rather than those of consumers and taxpayers. 
In the meantime, the political weight for the U.S. rice exporters is derived at 1.17 
on average.  It is higher than the weight for the taxpayers that we normalized at unity in  17  
order to compare with different interest groups.  Overall, table 2 illustrates the time trend 
in the political weight.  A change in the political weight could be interpreted as 
policymaker’s preferences changing overtime. 
Game Theoretic Procedure 
In this section, the econometric estimation and the political weights are 
incorporated into the game theoretic analysis to obtain the Nash equilibrium as a base.  
Based upon the base, a scenario analysis is conducted.  The base is an analysis with 
respect to the existing import and export policies in the three countries, which include 
tariffication and export programs.  The goal of this analysis is to look at some possible 
implications of a change from minimum access to a tariffication of imports for U.S. 
exports. 
The Base 
To develop the framework, it is necessary to determine the import tariff 
equivalents of Japan and Korea.  Import tariffs are defined as the difference between the 
domestic price and the world price.  Depending upon the world price path, future 
domestic prices are likely to decrease because the Japanese and Korean governments will 
have to reduce the import tariffs annually.  The domestic price is the world price plus the 
tariff equivalent.  And the price that producers received is government procurement price 
plus some type of producer support programs such as direct payments for Japan and 
Korea.  For U.S. price, we consider the price that the world price plus the difference 
between the loan rate and the world price for the base.  The reason is that the target 
price/deficiency program has been a major policy instrument for supporting producer 
income by paying directly the amount of deficiency payment to rice farmers during the 
1976-1995 period. The level of deficiency payment, the difference between the 
announced target price and actual market price (or loan rate) for rice, has been much 
higher than for other program commodities such as wheat and corn.  Due to the favorable 
incentives, the program participation rate has been over 90 percent for rice, which is 
much higher than for other program commodities.  However, the 1996 FAIR Act 
terminated the target price/deficiency payment program, and the marketing loan program 
will continue to provide income support to rice producers by allowing them to pay back  18  
their nonrecourse loans at prices below the loan rate when USDA announces world 
trading prices are less than the loan rate (USDA, 2000, Childs, 1996).   
In terms of surplus, this study considers consumer, producer, and government 
surpluses for Japan and Korea in the base.  For the U.S., exporter surplus is considered in 
the base.  The equations are as follows: 
CSURPit =  Dpd P
Pw
Pd
() ∫           (18) 
PSURPit =  Spd P
Pw
Ps
() ∫          (19) 
GSURPit = (TARIFit*IMPTit) – {(GPURPit*GPURit) + (EQUILit*GPURPit)}  (20) 
For U.S. exporter’s surplus, U.S. export revenue from Japan and Korea is taken 
into account because this study specifically looks at U.S. exports to Japan and Korea 
only.  The export surplus equation is the sum of exporter’s surplus from Japan and Korea.  
The export surplus equation is as follows: 





() () + ∫ ∫       ( 2 1 )  
where  Ep d P J
Pw
Ps
() ∫  and  Ep d P K
Pw
Ps
() ∫  are the U.S. exporter’s surplus from Japan and Korea, 
respectively.  In addition, the equilibrium is derived using the empirical econometric 
estimation equations for aggregated production and consumption for Japan and Korea 
and export demand for the U.S.  The other variables are exogenously given within the 
equation.  The equilibrium equation is as follows: 
EQUILit = PRODit + BESTKit + IMPTit – CONPit – EXPOTit  – ENSTKit  (22) 
where CSURPit = consumer surplus at time t in country i  
PSURPit = producer surplus at time t in country i  
GEXPit = government expenditure at time t in country i  
SCOTit = social costs at time t in country i 
EQUILit = equilibrium quantity at time t in country i 
PRODit = total production at time t in country i  19  
BESTKit = beginning stock at time t in country i 
IMPTit = import at time t in country i 
CONPit = total consumption at time t in country i 
EXPOTit = export at time t in country i 
ENSTKit = ending stock at time t in country i 
UEXSURt = U.S. export surplus at time t 
UEXPOTJt = U.S. export to Japan at time t 
UEXPOTKt = U.S. export to Korea at time t 
WOLDPt = world price at time t 
In economic theory, the equilibrium quantity should be zero to be equilibrium.  
However, in reality, that has not happened for the last four decades in Korea and Japan.  
Therefore, we consider the equilibrium quantity as the amount they need to import 
(export) if the sign is negative (positive).  If the sign is positive we consider the amount 
either to be in year ending stock or for foreign aids.  The reason is that there is no country 
that would be able to import rice from Japan and Korea due to the high prices, which are 
almost five to ten times higher than the world price.  For U.S. equilibrium quantity, we 
incorporate equation (7) into the equilibrium identity including U.S. exports to Japan and 
Korea. 
Depending upon the surplus and equilibrium, we consider the political weights 
derived in the previous section for the payoff functions.  The payoff functions include 
surplus, equilibrium quantity, and political weights to obtain the Nash equilibrium for the 
base. 
Vpi = (Wci*CSURPit (PDi)+ Wpi* PSURPit (PSi)+ Wgi * GEXPit(SQi) 
        *EQUILit) - SCOTit         ( 2 2 )  
where Vpi is the political payoff in country i, SQi is decoupled producer support (or direct 
payment) in region i.  Political weights are Wpi for producer, Wci for consumers, and Wgi 
for government (Karp, et. al, 1983). 
Using GAMS, the simulation results for the base are presented in Table 3.  The 
base year is 1999 because the important turning point for Japan and South Korea for the 
next negotiation is the year 1999 and because Japan adopted a tariffication policy in 
1999.  In the meantime, Korea is assumed to follow the tariffication policy since it has  20  
had tremendous political pressure from the major exporters.  As a result, we assume that 
the two countries’ major import policy is the tariffication policy. 
  Table 3 Simulation Results of the Payoff Functions for the Base. 
                                                                         Japan              Korea               U.S.     
        Production (1000MT)                              8356               4635               6502 
        Consumption (1000MT)                          8720               4750               3846 
        Export (1000MT)                                      200                      0               1804* 
        Import (1000MT)                                      170**                52**             321 
        Ending Stock (1000MT)                         1210                    73                 867 
        Beginning Stock (1000MT)                    1302                  137                 694 
        Equilibrium Quantity (1000MT)               -22                    99                 600 
        Producer Surplus (Million $)               21.133               6.489                   5.1*** 
        Consumer Surplus (Million $)               38.25                   7.2                N/A 
        Government Surplus (Million $)         54.853             13.369                N/A 
        Tariff Equivalent ($/MT)                      3428                1385                N/A 
        Payoffs                                                   2.508               0.572                6.63 
    *: total U.S. exports. 
    **: imports from the U.S. 
    ***: U.S. exporter surplus. 
    N/A: not available. 
 
As seen in Table 3, Japanese and Korean production is estimated at 8356 
thousand MT and 4635 thousand MT, respectively.  The 200 thousand MT of Japanese 
export is for foreign aid to North Korea and some countries in Africa.  The Japanese and 
Korean imports are derived at 170 thousand MT and 52 thousand MT, respectively.  The 
imports are from the U.S. only.  This study does not take imports from the ROW into 
account because it focuses on the trade flow between the U.S. and Japan and Korea.  
The equilibrium quantity for Japan, Korea, and the U.S. are –22 thousand MT, 99 
thousand MT, and 600 thousand MT, respectively.  The U.S. export quantity is derived 
at 1804 thousand MT, including exports to Japan, Korea, and the rest of the world 
(ROW).  In the meantime, the payoffs for Japan and Korea are derived at 2.508 and 
0.572, respectively.  And the U.S. export payoff from U.S. exports to Japan and Korea is 
derived at 6.63. 
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Scenario Analysis 
The next round of negotiations will likely require that the import requirements be 
made more transparent through tariffication.  Therefore, it is necessary to make several 
assumptions.  According to WTO agreement, Japan has to reduce import tariffs by 36%, 
and continue to reduce 6% of import tariff annually.  However, the tariff reduction will 
likely change in the next negotiation.  The possible range of the reduction would be from 
2% to 8% annually.  Therefore, we take the possible range of reduction into account for 
scenario analysis.  Under MA, Japan would have increased imports by 8%-12% of 
domestic consumption, from 2001 to 2006, and 12%-14% by 2010.  However, the 
Japanese government announced that they replaced the existing minimum access policy 
for tariffication beginning April 1, 1999.  Thus, the import policy scenario for Japan 
focuses on the tariffication.  In the meantime, Korean government tends to maintain the 
minimum access policy until 2004.  However, as mentioned earlier, the government has 
had tremendous political and economical pressure from major exporters such as the U.S. 
and CAIRNS group.  Therefore, tariffication policy is considered in the scenario analysis 
for Korea as well.  For the U.S., the existing CCC Credit Guarantee Programs (CCC), 
Market Access Program (MAP), and Foreign Market Development Program (FMDP) are 
considered in the scenario analysis to obtain the Nash equilibrium. 
The scenarios analyzed are as follows: 
1) CCC with 2% to 8% reduction in Japan and Korea. 
2) MAP with 2% to 8% reduction in Japan and Korea. 
3) FMDP with 2% to 8% reduction in Japan and Korea. 
4) CCC and MAP with 2% to 8% reduction in Japan and Korea. 
5) CCC and FMDP with 2% to 8% reduction in Japan and Korea. 
6) MAP and FMDP with 2% to 8% reduction in Japan and Korea. 
The simulation results for these scenarios are summarized in Table 4.  For policy 
comparison, the payoffs for the three countries are presented and the Nash equilibrium is 
obtained.  In addition, since Japan and Korea have similar current import policies and 
circumstances, sum of Japanese and Korean payoffs are presented so that we can consider 
the two countries as an export market from the standpoint of the United States of 
America.  22  
Moreover, ten-year average political weights are used, five years prior to WTO 
agreement implementation and five years after the implementation.  The political weights 
used for Japan are 1.261 and 0.739 for producer group and consumer group, respectively.  
For Korea, 1.436 and 0.564 for producer group and consumer group, respectively, are 
used for the scenario analysis.  The political weight for U.S. exporter group is 1.283.   
Each sub-game (where the U.S. scenario is fixed) has a unique Nash equilibrium.  
Table 4 shows that overall Nash equilibrium is 6% reduction under U.S. Market 
Development Program, including Market Access Program and Foreign Market 
Development Program.   
  Table 4. Payoff Summary. 
      J & K*     
 Action  T2C T4C T6C T8C 
 CCCUS  5.42 ; 1.62  5.53 ; 1.98  5.92 ; 2.0  6.14 ; 2.61 
 MAPUS  15.1 ; 15.3  15.7 ; 18.0  16.2 ; 19.5  16.4 ; 19.7 
U.S. FDPUS  52.2 ; 20.5  53.4 ; 20.3  54.7 ; 17.5  56.0 ; 20.1 
 CMPUS  30.8 ; 12.2  31.4 ; 16.3  32.7 ; 25.7  32.7 ; 19.6 
 CFPUS  68.1 ; 19.7  69.8 ; 20.4  71.3 ; 19.8  73.0 ; 19.9 
 MFPUS  137.4 ; 42.3  140.6 ; 59.7  143.8 ; 57.6  147.1 ; 52.5 
 *: represents sum of Japanese and Korean payoffs. 
 
For Japan and Korea, a dominant strategy is 4% reduction with the payoff of 59.7.  
Since they have tried to protect their import markets, they would try to keep their tariff 
rates as high as possible to restrict their import markets.  U.S. welfare increases as Japan 
and Korea move toward 8% reduction with the payoff of 147.1.  It is preferable for the 
U.S. to export to Japan and Korea with lower tariff rates as the higher tariff rates would 
result in lower U.S. exports to Japan and Korea.   
Under the MAP and FMDP programs, the U.S. can advertise U.S. rice through the 
Japanese telecommunication channels, such as national television and radio commercials 
(USDA, 2000).  That means the U.S. rice federation can promote U.S. rice throughout the 
nation, which increases opportunities for U.S. rice exports to Japan.  Unfortunately, 
promotional activities are not yet allowed in Korea.  However, the main question for U.S. 
exports to Japan and Korea is how to handle heavy competition with major exporters  23  
such as Australia, China, and other exporters in both markets and how to penetrate 
Japanese and Korean domestic markets and consumer table competition. 
Conclusion 
This study has analyzed the impacts of Japanese and Korean import policies on 
U.S. exports, including various changes in Japanese and Korean tariff rates.  In addition, 
it has analyzed the possible policy options for U.S. exports with respect to the changes 
in Japanese and Korean tariff rates, incorporating econometric estimation and political 
weights for the interest groups into a game theoretic analysis.   
Both Korea and Japan strictly implemented the WTO commitments on rice.   
However, several issues arose from how these countries managed rice imported.  The 
State Trading Enterprises (STEs) of both countries kept most imported rice away from 
domestic consumers.  The Food Agency of Japan allocated rice across national suppliers 
with results roughly mimicking commercial trade.  Japan also used markups to keep 
imported rice away from domestic consumers.  In Korea, rice has been imported through 
tenders where the lowest bidder wins.  This results in low-quality rice imports from 
suppliers who were unlikely to have been successful in commercial trade.  As a result, 
consumer benefits are reduced, and allocation across import suppliers has been affected.  
The next round of WTO negotiations will face these issues if quantitative market access 
is to improve in the interim while tariffs are reduced.  Subsequent meetings will also 
face STE issues regarding possible manipulations within approved market methods and 
the ways to encourage market results through market mechanisms. 
The best export policy option from the scenario analysis turned out to be the 
combination of MAP and FMDP for U.S. exports to Japan and Korea.  However, it 
depends on how the policies are implemented by the U.S. in Japanese and Korean 
domestic markets.  There are many obstacles in the two markets such as STEs and 
implicit trade barriers.  The implicit trade barriers are even worse than STEs because the 
consumers are willing to buy domestic rice at a higher price than the border price due to 
cultural and traditional backgrounds.  To overcome those obstacles, the U.S. has to 
investigate some new marketing strategies in the domestic markets, including wide 
variety of advertisements and private commercial contract with franchise restaurants and 
convenient stores along with political and economic pressures on the Japanese and  24  
Korea governments.  However, the U.S. could not be able to export any rice to Korea 
since 1980s.  Korea has imported its WTO commitments mostly from India and China 
because of lower prices and transportation costs.  Many international trade experts have 
expected that China will be a major exporter to Korea.  However, according to WTO 
agreement, Korea is supposed to import from 154 thousand MT in 2002 to 205 thousand 
MT in 2004.  That means that every rice exporters still have chances to export to Korea, 
including the U.S. 
In addition, the uncertain factors in Korea, in terms of potential U.S. rice exports, 
are Korea’s stock and political situations.  How these factors will affect future U.S. 
exports is still uncertain at this time.  In the past, in terms of stock, the Korean 
government has kept a minimum four-month reserve for both price stabilization and 
food/military security reasons and the policy-making process in rice trade is a politically 
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